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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to conduct an in-depth analysis of services acquisition 
management practices in the Army.  The objective of the research project is to build on 
the understanding developed in prior research projects and generate a data collection 
instrument that will identify the factors that promote or obstruct the use of best practices 
in acquisition management.  The study will help build upon identifying factors that 
influence the efficiency and effectiveness of service contracts.  In this study, data was 
collected from two Army contracting offices.  This study serves as a pilot for future 
research to be conducted at the remaining Mission and Installation Contracting Command 
offices.  The findings of the research show that service type affects contract 
characteristics and management practices.  The study also demonstrates that there is a 
relationship between capacity and management practices.  These findings show that the 
performance of service contracts can be improved through enhanced contract 
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Supplies and services acquisition in the Department of Defense (DoD) continue to 
increase in scope and dollars.  A Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2009c) report 
showed that DoD obligations in service contracts doubled between fiscal years (FY) 2001 
and 2008, from $92 to $200 billion, as shown in Figure 1.  This increase leads to a need 
to improve the performance of services acquisition in DoD business practices.  Business 
management reform comes about because of stewardship and accountability (Brook & 
Candreva, 2007).  However, a more current and pressing concern for reform is the rising 
national debt of $14 trillion. 
 
Figure 1.   DoD Contract Obligations and Contracting Workforce 
(GAO, 2009c) 
Fiscal responsibility has been a hot topic for the top leadership in the executive 
branch.  Financial security has an impact on national security (Peter G. Peterson 
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President of the United States (POTUS), identified a strong U.S. economy as part of the 
foundation for national security and as a fiscally sustainable path.  One action specific to 
this strategy is the reform of acquisition and contracting processes in the federal 
government, in which DoD acquisition and contracting accounts for 70% of all federal 
procurement spending (Office of the POTUS, 2010).   
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates has also addressed the need for 
fiscal responsibility in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (DoD, 2010) report 
and in several public announcements (Gates, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).  Like the POTUS, 
the SECDEF has pushed for “reforming how we buy” (DoD, 2010, p. 19) and improving 
the “conventional acquisition process that is currently too long and too cumbersome” (p. 
19).  The SECDEF has called for a 2–3% growth in the DoD budget, but a large part of 
this will come from savings in overhead costs in his tail-to-tooth initiative, finding 
savings in supporting functions of the DoD and transferring those dollars to the 
warfighters (Gates, 2010b).  Acquisition of services falls into the tail category of this 
initiative.  There must be a “demand for cost, schedule, and performance realism in the 
DoD acquisition process” (DoD, 2010, p. 99).  This can only come about with an 
adequate and trained workforce.  As a result, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) Ashton B. Carter has responded to the need for 
acquisition reform. 
B. USD(AT&L) RESPONDS 
On June 28, 2010, USD(AT&L) Carter submitted a memorandum to DoD 
acquisition professionals.  The memorandum’s topic was a mandate for restoring 
affordability and productivity in defense spending.  Mr. Carter’s guidance was to 
scrutinize the terms of every contract issued in order to ensure that they do not contain 
inefficiencies or unneeded overhead.  Due to the current economic environment, the DoD 
will have to “do more without more” (USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 4).  Therefore, it is critical 
to deliver better value to the taxpayer and to improve the way the DoD does business 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 3 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The DoD is relying increasingly on the private sector to provide a wide range of 
services, including consulting and administrative support, information technology 
services, and weapons systems and base operations support.  The DoD is the largest 
buyer of services in the federal government. It operates in an environment in which the 
nation’s large and growing structural deficit requires difficult resource decisions.  
Therefore, the DoD must maximize its return on investment and provide the warfighter 
with needed capabilities at the best value for the taxpayer (GAO, 2006b).  In an effort to 
deliver better value, it is important to know what services are being procured and what 
the costs are for those services in terms of percentage spent every year.  For example, 
services acquisition in the U.S. Army has continued to increase in scope and dollars over 
the last 10 years, with $34 billion spent in FY2008 across 25 different categories of 
services (GAO, 2010b).   
The Army has spent more on services than on supplies, equipment, and goods 
combined (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2010b).  The GAO cited three major reasons for this 
increase.  First, the DoD has increasingly relied on contractor-provided mission-critical 
services, to include everything from operating information technology systems to 
logistical support on the battlefield.  In a 2007 GAO report analyzing defense service 
contracts, the GAO reported that the “DoD’s obligations on service contracts, expressed 
in constant fiscal year 2006 dollars, rose from $85.1 billion in fiscal year 1996 to more 
than $151 billion in fiscal year 2006, a 78 percent increase” (p. 3).  More than 
$32 billion, or 21%, of the DoD’s obligations for services in fiscal year 2006 were for 
professional, administrative, and management support contracts (GAO, 2007).  Overall, 
the amount obligated on service contracts exceeded the amount the department spent on 
supplies and equipment, including major weapons systems.  As evidence of this, after the 
2001 terrorist attacks, first of all increased security requirements and deployment of 
active duty and reserve personnel resulted in the DoD having fewer military personnel to 
protect domestic installations.  Second, growth in service contracts increased in response 
to the way the DoD acquires certain capabilities (GAO, 2007).  For example, the Air 
Force secures its launch services from contractor-owned launch vehicles rather than uses 
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contractors to undertake major reconstruction projects and to provide support to the 
troops (GAO, 2007).  Such services typically include interpreters, intelligence analysts, 
and base operations support.  Although obligations continue to increase, the size of the 
acquisition workforce has decreased (GAO, 2007). 
In this section on the DoD’s response to improving service contracts acquisition, 
we illustrated how leaders from the POTUS to the USD(AT&L) are pushing for 
acquisition reform.  The next step would be for the individual military Services to take 
action.  However, because DoD services acquisition is so broad and complex, the 
problem must be addressed incrementally.  This leads to the topic of our research report, 
analyzing the management of service contracts in the Army. 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Our purpose in this research is to develop a comprehensive understanding of how 
the U.S. Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) manages the 
acquisition of services.  In this research, we build on the understanding developed in prior 
research projects by undertaking a focused, in-depth study of services acquisition in the 
Army so as to understand the drivers of acquisition management practices.  An 
understanding of these drivers helps us achieve the larger goal of improving the 
performance of service contracts, as illustrated in Figure 2.  We pursue four main 
objectives in this research: 
1) Build on the understanding developed in prior research projects and 
develop a data collection instrument that will identify the factors that 
promote or obstruct the use of best practices in acquisition management. 
2) Provide recommendations for how to save in the tail end of military 
operations in order to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
service contracts. 
3) Assess how the data collection form can be improved to apply this study 
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4) Create teaching materials for Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) instructors 
to use in acquisition and contracting courses. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Conceptual Model: Drivers of Acquisition Practices and 
Performance 
(Apte, Apte, et al., 2010b) 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this research, we attempt to answer the following three major questions as they 
relate to services acquisition within the U.S. Army MICC: 
1) Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?  
Complex requirements are often more difficult to define than simple 
requirements.  The complexity of the requirements determines the 
contracting vehicles and types of contracts to be used in acquiring services 
as well as how they are managed after they have been awarded to a service 
provider. 
2) Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices 
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standardized solution for managing service contracts.  In this research, we 
explore how contracting staff manage different service requirements. 
3) Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used?  Having adequate capacity for carrying 
out acquisition-related work can be considered one of the preconditions 
for use of best practices in acquisition management. 
E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The data we collected in this research will help in understanding and analyzing 
the management practices utilized in the U.S. Army MICC.  There are two benefits to this 
study.  First, this study is a continuation of previous studies in services acquisition, but it 
focuses more specifically on Army units.  This study also establishes a framework for 
future studies by developing a data collection and analysis tool to be applied across other 
contracting offices.  Second, in this research we identify areas to improve management 
practices in services acquisition.  The overall intent of this research is to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of meeting service requirements through contracting. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This research is limited by the broad nature of services acquisition.  The sample 
size used in the data collection for this research is only a small percentage of services 
being acquired by U.S. Army MICC in terms of categories of services, number of 
contracting offices, and number of contracts.  For example, there are over 20 Product and 
Service Codes (PSC) used to categorize services.  In this study, we only looked at four: 
two for complex requirements and two for simple requirements.  Also, there are 41 
contracting offices that report under the U.S. Army MICC but we used only two to 
collect data in this study.  Finally, of the four PSCs and two contracting offices we 
studied, we analyzed only 40 service contracts.  This is a small sample size for the 
number of service contracts at the U.S. Army MICC considering that the two centers we 
studied awarded over 1,400 contracts combined in FY2010 (MICC Headquarters, 2011).  
Due to this limited sample size, there may be drivers of management practices and 
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these potentially overlooked drivers in Chapters IV and V of this report and give 
recommendations for how further studies can supplement the limitations of this research 
project. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
We conducted this research by collecting contract and management practice data 
from two MICC installations.  In this research project, we focused on collecting 
objective-based data.  We developed a data collection form (see Appendix A) that was 
geared toward achieving the objectives and answering the questions discussed previously.  
We ran a pilot study at one MICC DOC, Presidio of Monterey (POM).  We then used the 
lessons learned from the pilot study to further refine the Data Collection Form.  Once we 
finalized the form, it was deployed at two MICC centers.  We analyzed the data we 
collected quantitatively and qualitatively to draw conclusions about management 
practices at those two MICC centers. 
H. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I includes background 
information, the purpose of the report, research questions, the benefits and limitations of 
the project, and the research methodology we used.  In Chapter II, we review literature 
related to services acquisition. We also examine several NPS research reports, DoD 
memorandums, and GAO reports.  Our purpose in Chapter II is to explore previous 
studies in order to determine how this research project will help further those studies.  In 
Chapter III, we present the mission and organization of the MICC.  In Chapter IV, we 
describe the research methodology in more detail.  We also outline the procedures we 
used for collecting and analyzing data.  In Chapter V, we examine the collected data and 
present the findings of the analysis to help answer our three research questions.  The 
information we present in Chapter VI summarizes the research by responding to the 
research questions, making recommendations to the U.S. Army MICC on acquisition 
management practices, offering ways to improve the data collection, applying this 
research to other DoD contracting units, and suggesting areas to consider for further 
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I. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided background information on services acquisition 
within the DoD and discussed how services acquisition ties in to the policies and 
objectives of the country’s top leadership.  The information we provided suggests that 
acquisition reform will not only improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service 
contracts, but also support a larger vision of financial and national security.  In the next 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In this literature review, we explore topics and research relevant to the acquisition 
management practices in the DoD.  Our purpose is to establish a foundation on which this 
research project can build.  First, we present the foundational theories that are used in 
contracting.  Second, we provide an introduction to public management reform (PMR) as 
a tool for defense acquisition professionals to use to make improvements to acquisition 
management practices.  Third, we discuss the service contracting processes and 
management practices used by the DoD in order to identify areas of performance 
shortfalls.  Finally, we present a summary of prior NPS Acquisition Research Program 
(ARP) projects related to the field of DoD services acquisition to illustrate how this study 
builds on previous research. 
B. THEORIES INFORMING SERVICE CONTRACTING 
This section describes the foundational theories applied to the field of contracting.  
The two theories we discuss are the agency and transaction cost theory.  We present the 
conceptual framework of these theories and discuss how they are applied to the field on 
government contracting. 
The agency theory describes the relationships between principals and agents 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  There are several principal–agent relationships in government 
contracting.  The most prominent one is the relationship between the government 
(principal) and the contractor (agent).  In the government–contractor relationship, the 
government has a requirement for a product or service that can be provided by the 
contractor.  Both the principal and agent have objectives.  These objectives may be 
aligned, but misaligned objectives typically lead to conflicting goals.  Agency theory is 
concerned with these conflicting goals.  It focuses on how contracts are planned, 
structured, awarded, and administered by the government (principal) to ensure its 
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The transaction cost theory takes into account indirect costs associated with a 
product or service (Williamson, 2010).  In application, those analyzing the costs 
associated with a service contract must not consider only the contract price.  They must 
also take into account administrative costs such as the time and resources spent by the 
government in the planning, solicitation, awarding, oversight, and closeout of the 
contract.  Thus, when a proposal is made that claims to add value to the contracting 
process, both the costs and benefits must be taken into consideration. 
While theory is conceptual, practice is reality.  Bridging the gap between theory 
and practice requires a consideration for the organization to which the changes are being 
recommended.  The Army tends to be a late adopter of transformation and technology, to 
be focused on quick and decisive actions, to have strong ties to the civilian population, 
and to embrace teamwork (Haynes, n.d.).  Army Regulation 70-13 (Department of the 
Army [DA], 2010) has provided a roadmap for improving management and oversight of 
services acquisition.  However, implementing these changes requires creative approaches 
to transforming an organization that is resistant to change and to regulating over 
aggressiveness when the expectation is to have tasks completed yesterday. 
C. PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) defined public management reform (PMR) as 
“deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the 
objective of getting them to run better” (p. 8).  In Chapter I, we presented examples of 
how the POTUS, SECDEF, and AT&L) have been pushing for PMR, specifically in 
acquisition.  At the Service level, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (ASA[AT&L]) Lieutenant General William Phillips has 
announced his support for SECDEF Gates’ tail-to-tooth initiative by launching a review 
of the DoD acquisition process in order to reduce costs and gain efficiency, thereby 
helping to reduce overhead (Roosevelt, 2010).   
Acquisition reform is not a new concept for the DoD.  Acquisition reform began 
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acquisition process.  Christie (2006) discusses some of the major acquisition reform 
initiatives, which include the following: 
 Fitzhugh Commission, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970), 
 Steadman Review (1977), 
 Carlucci Acquisition Initiative (1981), 
 Packard Commission (1986), 
 Goldwater–Nichols Act (1986), 
 Defense Management Review (1989), 
 Defense Science Board (DSB) Streamlining Study (1990, 1993–1994), 
 Total System Performance Responsibility Initiative (1990s), and 
 Spiral Development and Capabilities-Based Acquisition (2000s). 
In research by Francis and Walther (2006), they found that acquisition and 
logistics reform has been a large part of the initiatives recently pushed by the SECDEFs.  
However, despite the drive for improvement, Brook and Candreva (2007) found in their 
research that “two decades of acquisition reform have not significantly improved 
program management practices” (p. 9).  Similarly, the Army has pushed for acquisition 
reform.  The Gansler Report by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations (2007) identified that Army acquisition 
management had the same struggles in 2007 as it did in 2001. 
Despite the reform efforts, there are still inherent problems with acquisition 
reform due to the conflicting interests of the components in the defense acquisition 
system.  The 2006 Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report (DAPA 
Panel) conceptualized the acquisition system—referred to in the report as the Big A—as 
shown in Figure 3.  The Big A consists of three interdependent processes: requirements 
generation through a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); 
budgeting through Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE); and 
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than being cohesive and stable as Figure 3 shows, the acquisition system is disconnected 
and unstable, as Figure 4 shows.  The DAPA Panel (2006) observed that the system was 
complex and fragmented, leading to competing values and objectives among the three 
processes.  Within each individual process, there are competing values as well.  For 
instance, in little a, the contracting office needs to ensure that competition is exercised as 
uch as possible by soliciting multiple suppliers for a service, whereas the supported unit 
may prefer a specific supplier through sole-sourcing. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Conceptual Acquisition System (Big A) 
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Figure 4.   Big A in Practice—Disconnected and Unstable 
(DAPA Panel, 2006) 
 
The recommendations we make in this research report take into consideration 
previous attempts at making improvements to acquisition management.  They also take 
into consideration some foundational principles in the field of PMR, including managing 
trade-offs, balances, limits, dilemmas, contradictions, and paradoxes of proposals (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2004).  For example, SECDEF Gates has called for reduction in overhead, 
but in order to improve performance in contractor oversight, there may be a need to 
increase the acquisition workforce.  Another reform tool we reference in this research is 
Light’s (1997) four tides of reform: scientific management (efficiency), war on waste 
(economy), watchful eye (fairness), and liberation management (entrepreneurialism; pp. 
15–43).  Light’s (1997) concept looks at ways performance can be enhanced and takes 
into consideration if current efforts are new ideas or things that have already been 
attempted in the past.   
D. SERVICE CONTRACTS 
In this section, we show the broad scope and complexity of service contracts in 
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understanding the performance of service contracts.  The service sector is one of the 
largest and fastest growing industries in the U.S. economy (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 
2010a).  The DoD, the largest federal purchaser of services, spent $200 billion in services 
during FY2008—a sum that constituted half of all DoD contractual obligations (GAO, 
2002, 2009c).  The DoD spends more on services than it does on the procurement of 
supplies and equipment combined, including weapons systems (Apte, Apte, et al., 2010a; 
GAO, 2003).   
The Army has seen a similar pattern in services acquisition with an increase in 
service contract obligations and contractor full-time equivalents (FTEs).  Table 1, which 
contains data collected from the GAO and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA[M&RA]), depicts this increase.  This increase in 
services comes with a decrease in the acquisition workforce as well.  Figure 1 (see 
Chapter I) shows a level workforce from FY2001 through FY2008; however, Figure 5 
shows that the acquisition workforce is actually on a decline, which is due to the 
retirement of an aging workforce.  This decline in the acquisition workforce raises the 
concern for the performance of service contracts when the scope and value of work has 
increased but there is less manpower to manage it. 
 
Table 1.   Service Contract Inventory in the Army for FY2008 and FY2009 
(ASA[M&RA], 2009; GAO, 2010b) 
 FY2008 FY2009 
Service Contract Obligations $34 billion $43 billion 
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Figure 5.   DoD Procurement Budget and Acquisition Workforce Trends 
(Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 2007) 
 
The dollar value spent on service contracts in the DoD is large, and managing the 
broad scope is even more complex.  There are over 20 different types of services 
identified by the General Services Administration (GSA), each with a specific 
designation in the Product and Service Codes Manual (GSA, 1998).  Therefore, to 
narrow this research project to a more manageable size, we analyzed only four Army 
product and service codes (PSCs).  The four services we selected were PSC R 
(Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services); PSC J (Maintenance, 
Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment); PSC S (Utilities and Housekeeping Services); and 
PSC D (Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services).  We selected 
these PSCs, highlighted in Table 2, because they constitute over 60% of the service 
contracts in terms of dollar value for the Army for FY2009, and are common services 
used across all installations. PSC A (Research and Development) and PSC U (Education 
and Training) were not used because they are not common services across all military 
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simple-type services.  Complex-type services are services that require unique skills in 
contractors and are more difficult to define than simple-type services. 
Table 2.   Breakdown of Service Contracts in the Army for FY2009 
(ASA[M&RA], 2009; GSA, 1998) 





R 11,674,519,717 27.4% Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services 
J 7,645,271,950 18.0% Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment 
A 6,472,306,540 15.2% Research and Development 
S 5,015,441,637 11.8% Utilities and Housekeeping Services 
U 1,909,983,556 4.5% Education and Training Services 
D 1,689,891,641 4.0% Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunication Services 
C 1,557,067,711 3.7% Architect and Engineering Services—Construction  
B 1,247,897,017 2.9% Special Studies and Analyses—Not R&D 
M 1,160,055,305 2.7% Operation of Government-owned Facility 
Y 897,151,344 2.1% Construction of Structures and Facilities 
Q 489,328,909 1.1% Medical Services 
V 455,413,266 1.1% Transportation, Travel, and Relocation Services 
Z 454,447,794 1.1% Maintenance, Repair, or Alteration of Real Property 
F 394,962,703 0.9% Natural Resources Management 
L 353,565,935 0.8% Technical Representative Services 
K 237,852,282 0.6% Modification of Equipment 
W 208,523,670 0.5% Lease or Rental of Equipment 
O 201,915,384 0.5% Other 
N 183,192,192 0.4% Installation Equipment 
G 155,301,816 0.4% Social Services 
P 90,103,239 0.2% Salvage Services 
H 45,398,154 0.1% Quality Control, Testing, and Inspection Services 
T 25,816,540 0.1% Photographic, Mapping, Printing, and Publication Services 
E 6,270,563 <1.0% Purchase of Structures and Facilities 
X 1,680,844 <1.0% Lease or Rental of Facilities 
Total 42,573,359,708 100.0%  
Note. The PSCs we studied in this research are highlighted in grey.  
The main document that provides policy and guidance on federal acquisition is 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2005), with further policy and guidance 
defined by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS, 2010).  
Parts 37 and 237 pertain to services acquisition in the FAR and the DFARS, respectively.   
Although service contracting is broad and complex, with various categories and 
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common terminology and to streamline management practices.  One common way to 
manage service contracts is through the six-phase procurement process illustrated in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 6.   Six-Phase Process in Procurement 
(Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, & Rendon, 2006) 
 
First, the Procurement Planning phase develops a plan for the who, what, when, 
where, why, and how of procuring services outside the government.  This phase includes 
translation of requirements into a statement of work (SOW) or performance work 
statement (PWS), market research, budget and cost estimates, identification of 
preliminary contracting methods, and risk analysis.  Second, the Solicitation Planning 
phase develops documents in preparation for solicitation, such as the request for proposal 
(RFP).  This phase identifies the specific contracting methods to be used and determines 
contract type, selection criteria for contract award, and finalization of the SOW or PWS.  
Third, the Solicitation phase includes the posting the solicitation under the agency’s 
procurement portal.  It includes advertising the requirements, answering contractor 
questions, and maintaining a database of prospective bidders.  Fourth, the Source 
Selection phase receives and analyzes contractor proposals.  This includes evaluation of 
contractor proposals based off of predetermined criteria and the selection of the 
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Administration phase begins after contract award.  The purpose of this phase is to ensure 
that both the contractor and government are meeting the terms and conditions of the 
contract.  The activities include pre-performance conferences, tracking contractor 
progress and performance, and management of contract modifications.  Sixth, the final 
phase is Contract Closeout or Termination.  Contracts can be terminated when both 
parties meet all their obligations in the contract, terminated for convenience by the 
government, or terminated for default when the contractor cannot meet the terms and 
conditions of the contract (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
Another common model used in acquisitions is the project life cycle illustrated in 
Figure 7.  It is similar to the six-phase contracting model.  The commonality of the two is 
that they follow a cradle-to-grave concept.  The product or service is managed all the way 
from when a requirement emerges to the closeout where all parties have satisfied their 
obligations. 
Figure 7.   Project Life Cycle 
(Apte & Rendon, 2007) 
 
The Department of the Army (DA, 2010) has established policy and guidance in 
its Management and Oversight of Service Acquisitions (Army Regulation 70-13) that are 
based on the contracting processes and models of Figures 6 and 7.  This regulation is 
organized by pre-award and post-award activities but still holds to the cradle-to-grave 
concept.  An additional element presented in the regulation is the team approach, which 
includes roles and responsibilities for stakeholders within the government.  This team 
approach provides an integrated effort.  However, the concept can only work with an 
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contract management, in which the issues addressed all tie to two common themes, 
deficiencies in human capital and capable processes. 
E. SERVICE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
Spotting problems early and often in the acquisition process can result in less 
costly resolutions.  The GAO (2010a) found that “problems are much more costly to fix 
in later stages than early in the acquisition” (p. 2).  However, the DoD continues to face 
challenges in employing sound business practices in service contracts (GAO, 2009b).  
The GAO (2007) reported the DoD’s management of services acquisition as being 
reactive, fragmented, and uncoordinated, leading to inefficient and ineffective 
performance.  DoD contract management has been on the GAO’s (2010a) high-risk list 
for nearly two decades.  For the Army, analyses by the GAO and the DoD Inspector 
General (DoDIG) show that the problem areas of acquisition management in service 
contracts fall into Phases I (Procurement Planning), IV (Source Selection), and V 
(Contract Administration) of the procurement process.  Specifically, the Army faces 
challenges in generating requirements, evaluating prices to be fair and reasonable, and 
surveilling of contractors (Ermoshkin & Seifert, 2010).  The remaining paragraphs of this 
section go into detail on each of these deficiencies, with a common theme that revolves 
around the deficiencies in human capital and capable contract management processes. 
Clearly identifying, defining, and stating requirements is essential in the 
acquisition process.  For example, research by Wardwell (1997) showed that the 
ambiguity in requirements and statements of work (SOW) can lead to legal claims and 
increases in the costs to acquire a service.  However, there are instances in which 
requirements cannot be clearly defined until a later date.  For example, in PSC R 
(Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services), contracting for 
management services may be hard to define because the tasks are non-routine and 
unpredictable.  One approach to help resolve requirement ambiguity is through 
performance-based services acquisition (PBSA).  The FAR (2005) identifies PBSA as the 
preferred method for acquiring services (Subpart 37.102).  This process focuses on the 
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allows for innovation and competition to occur among contractors in order to find 
different and better ways to satisfy a requirement, which ultimately leads to increased 
performance (Rau & Stambersky, 2009).  Guiding principles by the Army to enforce the 
PBSA standard include the submission of requirements by acquisition personnel to senior 
management for review and approval and describing results rather than methods when 
developing contracts (DA, 2010).  However, PBSA requires metrics to determine if 
contractors are satisfying requirements.  Developing requirements, whether task based or 
performance based, still involves the human element.  Thus, the themes of addressing the 
need for an adequate acquisition workforce and capable processes emerge.   
Receiving a fair and reasonable price for a service can mean different things for 
different requirements.  In lowest priced technically acceptable (LPTA) contracts, the 
contractor with the lowest price satisfying the minimum requirements gets awarded the 
contract.  In best-value contracts, there may be tradeoffs between price and other non-
priced related factors (quality, schedule, past performance).  The government may be 
willing to pay more for higher quality service.  However, the GAO (2006b, 2010c) has 
issued reports showing that the DoD continues to struggle with obtaining enough 
competition to get the lowest prices and with having clear rating factors to determine if 
the added benefit is worth the cost.  Another pricing consideration is providing incentives 
to contractors.  Again, the DoD faces challenges in maintaining fair and reasonable prices 
of contracts due to inconsistent implementation of incentive programs (GAO, 2006a, 
2006b).  The contract type can also play a significant role in pricing.  Firm-fixed-price 
(FFP) contracts place the risk on the contractor, whereas cost-reimbursable contracts 
place the risk on the government.  Knowing what pricing options to apply to a situation 
requires a trained and experienced workforce.  To address these contract pricing issues, 
the Army (DA, 2010) has developed guiding principles.  However, the common themes 
are seen again for requiring the right workforce and having capable processes. 
Although the contractor is responsible for meeting the requirements of a contract, 
the government must still have control measures in place to ensure that its interests are 
protected.  Investing government resources for control measures is a small price to pay to 
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to risks and waste and, in turn, can affect the performance of service contracts (Rau & 
Stambersky, 2009).  GAO reports continue to find that the DoD lacks contractor 
surveillance in its service contracts (McMaster & Miranda, 2008; Rau & Stambersky, 
2009).  Part of the issue is that the government has inadequate metrics in place to assess 
the contractors (Solomon & Travieso, 2008).  Another problem relates to having an 
acquisition workforce with sufficient skills.  For example, the GAO assessed that if the 
Army would have had an adequate oversight staff, then it could have saved substantially 
on a logistics contract in Iraq (Rau & Stambersky, 2009).  The Army’s guiding principles 
on services acquisition emphasize the need for clear performance measures and for 
holding contractors accountable to meeting contract requirements (DA, 2010).  Doing so 
requires an adequately trained oversight staff of quality assurance evaluators (QAEs), 
also known as contracting officer’s representatives (CORs).  The DA requires QAEs to 
have, at a minimum, training in the Defense Acquisition University course CLC-106, 
Contracting Officer’s Representative with a Mission Focus (DA, 2010), to perform 
surveillance of service contracts.  However, this again ties back to the need for an 
adequately staffed and trained acquisition workforce and the need for capable contract 
administration processes.  Policies and plans are in place to ensure proper oversight, but 
there is still difficulty executing these policies and plans due to an inadequate workforce. 
Figure 1 shows a trend of increasing obligations in service contracts for the DoD, 
but Figure 5 shows a decreasing trend in the ability of the acquisition workforce to 
manage these contracts.  The GAO (2009a) recommended an increase in the workforce in 
order to improve the performance of services acquisition.  However, increasing the size 
of the workforce will not necessarily solve the problem.  Management of human capital 
has also been on the GAO’s high-risk list since 2001 (GAO, 2009a).  Having the right 
people doing the right work is essential for any program (GAO, 2010a).  Thus, it is 
important to have adequate staffing in terms of size, but staff members must also have 
adequate training and experience to carry out their duties.  Rau and Stambersky (2009) 
summarized in their report their findings on service contract management in the DoD and 
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While these obligations continued to rise, the size of the acquisition 
workforce was downsized without sufficient attention to requisite skills 
and competencies needed to manage service contracts. DoD continues to 
rely more and more on contractors to provide services despite 
longstanding problems with contract management that continue to 
adversely impact services acquisition outcomes. (p. 7) 
F. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS CAPABILITY 
Contracts are only as successful as the processes that are used to create and 
manage them.  Organization process capability is an important aspect of contract 
management.  In an assessment of ACC contract management process capability using 
the Contract Management Maturity Model (Rendon, 2010a), most of the organizations 
observed tended to have the lowest level of process capabilities in the Contract 
Administration and Contract Closeout phases of the procurement process.  Most 
organizations had Structured maturity levels in the Procurement Planning phase up to the 
Source Selection phase, but they only had Basic maturity levels in the Contract 
Administration and Contract Closeout phases (Rendon).  These organizations had not 
reached optimized levels in any of the procurement process phases.  As a result, they 
have opportunities available to them to improve their performance of services acquisition 
by enhancing their contract management process capability. 
G. PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED RESEARCH 
There has been a series of five ARP-sponsored research projects on services 
acquisition in the DoD over the past several years.  The first two research projects, 
Services I (Apte, Ferrer, et al., 2006) and Services II (Apte & Rendon, 2007), were 
exploratory, and the researchers’ intent was to gain an understanding of the types of 
services being acquired, the associated rates of growth in services acquisition, and the 
major challenges and opportunities present in the service supply chain.  The next two 
research projects, Services III (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2008) and Services IV (Apte, 
Apte, & Rendon, 2009), were survey-based empirical studies aimed at developing a 
higher level of understanding of how services acquisition is currently being managed at 
DoD installations, which included the Air Force, Army, and Navy.  The focus of the 
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contract types, and use of incentives); acquisition management methods (degree of 
competition, contract types, and use of incentives); acquisition management methods 
(regional- versus installation-level acquisition, use of program management, project 
leadership); and other program management issues (use of the life cycle approach, 
adequacy of staffing levels, length of assignments, and level of training). The analysis of 
survey data indicated that the current state of services acquisition management suffers 
from several deficiencies, including deficit billet and manning levels (which are further 
aggravated by insufficient training and the inexperience of acquisition personnel), and the 
lack of a strong management approach.  
The Services V research project (Apte, Apte et al., 2010a) analyzed and compared 
the results of the primary data collected in the Services III and IV reports, which involved 
Air Force, Army, and Navy contracting organizations, so as to develop a more thorough 
and comprehensive understanding of how services acquisition is being managed within 
individual DoD departments.  In the conclusion of the research in the Services V report, 
the researchers (Apte, Apte, et al., 2010a) indicated that contracts for the analyzed 
services were predominantly competitively bid, fixed-price contracts.  In addition, 
services acquisition for the Navy was predominantly managed at the regional level, 
whereas the Air Force and the Army managed services acquisition using a project-team 
approach in which the procurement contracting officer (PCO) predominantly led the 
project team.  The study (Apte, Apte, et al., 2010a) also found that the PCO owned the 
service requirement (less frequently, but significantly) for the Army and Navy, and the 
PCO provided contractor surveillance approximately half of the time for the Navy.  The 
report concluded that project life cycles were not consistently used in services acquisition 
in any of the military Services. 
The Services I through V research has resulted in a total of 14 papers.  A 
comprehensive, high-level understanding of services acquisition in the DoD has resulted 
from these research projects.  The next logical step would be a more in-depth study in 
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H. SUMMARY  
This chapter provided an overview of previous research in the field of DoD 
services acquisition management.  The purpose of the chapter was to establish the 
foundation on which this research project builds and to apply previous studies in DoD 
services acquisition specifically to Army MICC centers.  The information presented in 
this chapter showed how the different elements of service contract management are 
integrated and showed that an incremental approach is required to analyze the system due 
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III. MISSION AND INSTALLATION CONTRACTING 
COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Army Contracting 
Command (ACC) and to explain where the Mission Installation Contracting Command 
(MICC) falls within the ACC.  In this chapter, we first describe the shortfalls in Army 
contracting and the issues that resulted in the establishment of a new contracting 
command.  In the second part of the chapter, we outline the MICC’s purpose, mission, 
and organizational structure. 
The Gansler Commission’s (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007) reported 
that the Army has a serious deficiency in contract and contract management personnel.  
During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
numerous contracting scandals occurred.  These scandals made it apparent that the Army 
lacked trained and experienced contracting officers (KOs). Based on this information, the 
Army established the ACC. 
The Gansler Commission’s (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007) report 
recommended four areas for the Army to work on: 
1) Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and 
civilian contracting; 
2) Restructure the organization and restore responsibility to facilitate 
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and continental 
United States (CONUS) operations; 
3) Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary operations; and 
4) Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness in expeditionary operations. (pp. 47–58) 
The issues the Army first focused on were the number of contracting personnel 
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downsized the number of contracting personnel, but there was an increase in the number 
and complexity of contracting actions.  During the 1990s, the Army determined that 
many services provided by both military personnel and DoD civilians could be completed 
more effectively and for less cost by contractors.  As a result, the number of contractors 
increased as the number of experienced contracting personnel decreased.  By the mid 
2000s, there was approximately a seven-fold workload increase on Army contracting 
personnel (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007). 
The second issue the Army focused on was the restructuring of the contracting 
organization in order to promote coordination among contracting activities.  The Army’s 
contracting resources were dispersed throughout numerous commands, with no command 
having direct authority over all of the contracting offices.  In addition to a dispersed 
organization, there were no general officer positions available in the contracting field.  
This lack of a flag officer created problems with planning and supporting operations.  
The Gansler Commission’s (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007) report stated, 
These flag officers would have been at the table planning and supporting 
the operation.  Another benefit of having contracting flag officer positions 
is the increased attractiveness of the contracting corps as a career 
profession to quality officers that aspire to flag officer rank. (p. 13) 
For the third issue, the Gansler Commission’s (Commission on Army Acquisition, 
2007) report observed that there was an extreme shortage of Army contracting staff who 
were fully trained and experienced enough to support expeditionary operations.  Due to 
the Army’s downsizing of contracting personnel, approximately 3% of all the Army 
contracting personnel were active duty military by 2005 (Commission on Army, 2007).  
This lack of personnel has caused the Army to rely heavily on contractors to provide 
contracting support for overseas contracting operations.  
B. ACC MISSION AND ORGANIZATION 
Due to the reasons outlined previously, it was evident that the Army needed to 
implement changes to improve its contracting competence and capability.  The Army 
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operations was mission critical (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007).  In order to 
accomplish this requirement, the Army established the ACC. 
The mission of the ACC is to provide global contracting support to warfighters 
through the full spectrum of military operations.  It reports directly to the Army Material 
Command (AMC).  The recent reorganization of Army contracting units is illustrated in 
Figure 8.  The reorganization allows for better oversight and management of contingency 
contracting, program management, and installation-level contracting.  The ACC has two 
subordinate commands: the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and the Mission 
and Installation Command (MICC).  Each of the subordinate commands is led by a 
brigadier general.  The ECC covers contingency contracting, supporting the warfighter 
through seven Contract Support Brigades.  The MICC covers CONUS installation 
contracting, supporting the warfighter through 41 centers and DOCs.  Finally, there are 
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Figure 8.   ACC Organization Chart 
(ECC Headquarters, 2009) 
C. MICC PURPOSE, MISSION, AND ORGANIZATION 
As part of the Army’s Generating Force, the mission of the MICC is to plan, 
integrate, award, and administer contracts throughout the Army Force Generation 
(ARFORGEN) cycle by supporting the Army Commands (ACOMs), Direct Reporting 
Units (DRUs), U.S. Army, North (USARNORTH), and other organizations in order to 
provide the best value for the mission, for the Soldiers, and for their families (ACC, 
2010).  The MICC functions as an integral and indispensable partner in accomplishing 
the Army's mission through contracted materiel and services solutions.  With the 
establishment of the MICC, improved coordination and responsiveness has occurred, 
which has resulted in superior contracting support.  Also, the MICC has a general officer 
billet, which not only serves as an advocate for the contracting community but also 
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has provided a framework for contracting personnel to provide excellent contracting 
support.  
The MICC is organized with seven regional contracting centers and 34 
Directorate of Contracting (DOCs).  Currently, the centers and DOCs report directly to 
MICC headquarters, as shown in Figure 9.  Planning is in place to restructure the 
organization so that the DOCs report to the centers as intermediaries for MICC 
headquarters. 
 
Figure 9.   MICC Organization Structure 
(MICC Public Affairs Officer, 2010) 
Table 3 shows a breakdown of the PSCs for contracts awarded by the MICC in 
FY2009.  The highlighted PSCs are the ones we studied in this research.  As discussed in 
Chapter II, these PSCs were selected because they constitute the largest part of the 
service contracts for the Army in terms of dollar value and are common services used 
across all installations. PSC A (Research and Development), PSC M (Operations of 
Government-owned Facilities), and PSC U (Education and Training) were not used 
because they are not common services across all military installations.  PSCs R and D 
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this research, two MICC centers were selected for data collection, which we refer to as 
Center A and Center B in this report. 
Table 3.   Breakdown of MICC Service Contract Dollar Obligations for FY2009 
(ASA[M&RA], 2009; GSA, 1998) 
PSC % of $FY09 Obligations for Service Contracts Service Category 
R 24.44% Professional, Administrative and Management Support Services 
U 19.82% Education and Training Services 
D 11.79% Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunication Services 
S 8.95% Utilities and Housekeeping Services 
M 8.16% Operation of Government-Owned Facility 
A 6.40% Research and Development 
J 6.16% Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment 
C 4.58% Architect and Engineering Services—Construction  
Z 3.21% Maintenance, Repair, or Alteration of Real Property 
Y 2.98% Construction of Structures and Facilities 
N 0.96% Installation Equipment 
B 0.74% Special Studies and Analyses—Not R&D 
F 0.40% Natural Resources Management 
L 0.37% Technical Representative Services 
W 0.27% Lease or Rental of Equipment 
V 0.25% Transportation, Travel, and Relocation Services 
T 0.17% Photographic, Mapping, Printing, and Publication Services 
Q 0.16% Medical Services 
H 0.09% Quality Control, Testing and Inspection Services 
P 0.04% Salvage Services 
G 0.03% Social Services 
X 0.01% Lease or Rental of Facilities 
O 0.01% Other 
Total 100.0%  
Note. The PSCs we studied in this research are highlighted in grey.  
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we laid the foundation for the study of the MICC.  We presented 
the issues outlined in the Gansler Report that ultimately led to the reorganization of the 
Army’s contracting units.  As a result of this reorganization, the MICC was established to 
provide contracting services for CONUS installations.  In this chapter, we also presented 
a discussion of the service contracts awarded by the MICC broken down by PSC.  This 
data, which we obtained through the MICC, is the source on which this research is based.  
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of how we collected and analyzed data in 
order to achieve the objectives and answer the research questions discussed in Chapter I.  
We discuss how we selected the participants for this research, the data collection form 
questions, and what information we extracted from the data.  In this chapter, we also 
include a description of the qualitative and quantitative methods we used in analyzing the 
data collected from the Army MICC centers. 
B. PARTICIPATION SELECTION 
As we discussed in Chapter III, the MICC is configured with seven regional 
contracting centers and 34 DOCs.  Our overall intent in this research was to conduct an 
in-depth analysis of the service contract procurement methods and of the management 
methods used at two of the MICC Regional Contracting Centers as well as to build a data 
collection form that can be used for future research on the remaining five Regional 
Contracting Centers and on all 34 MICC DOCs.  We conducted a pilot study using the 
data collection form at one MICC DOC.  The purpose of the pilot was to allow for the 
refinement of the questions on the form and to identify any shortcomings of the data 
analysis tool.  After adjustments in the pilot test, we commenced data collection at two 
MICC centers.  Both of these locations were Regional Contracting Centers and had a 
wide variety of service contracts that we could analyze.  We analyzed the collected data 
quantitatively and qualitatively in order to draw conclusions about management practices 
at the MICC centers.  We also collected data from five different service contracts for each 
of the following codes: PSC R (Professional, Administrative, and Management Support 
Services); PSC J (Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment); PSC S (Utilities 
and Housekeeping Services); and PSC D (Automatic Data Processing and 
Telecommunications Services).  We used a total of 20 contracts at each MICC center for 
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C. DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS 
An example of the data collection form is included in Appendix A.  We 
developed the data collection form to answer the following questions: 
1) Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
2) Do the type of services being acquired affect the management practices 
being used?   
3) Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used?  
Part I of the form focuses on contract characteristics, including type of service 
contract, solicitation approach, value, and award basis.  Part I also collects information on 
management practices, including whether a team approach was used, the number of 
people assigned to the contract, the requirements generation, the number of 
modifications, the contract surveillance, and the contract closeout. 
Part II of the form focuses on the capacity of the contracting offices in relation to 
their management practices.  The questions in Part II provide the number and dollar value 
of service contracts awarded in FY2010, the annual budget for the service contracts staff, 
the number of billets authorized and filled at each contract office, and the training level 
and certification of each contract staff member.  Other questions address the amount of 
experience and the average workload.  At the end of Part II, we gave participants an 
opportunity to offer feedback such as concerns, comments, and recommendations for 
improving the data collection form.  
D. ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
We used descriptive and inferential statistics to analyze the data collected from 
the two MICC centers.  In Chapter V, we present nominal (qualitative) and interval 
(quantitative) data in graphical and tabular formats.  We draw relationships from these 
graphs and tables to help answer the three research questions identified in Chapter I.  In 
order to support these relationships, we use information from the literature review to 
identify the drivers of acquisition management practices at the two different MICC 
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test the relationship between the different drivers of performance in service contracts, we 
applied a chi-squared test of a contingency table using the following equation: 
      (1) 
In Equation 1, k is the number of cells in the cross-classification table, f is the 
observed value, and e are the expected values.  The chi-squared value (χ2) corresponds 
with a p value in a chi-squared distribution table.  A lower p value indicates a stronger 
relationship between two variables. 
E. SUMMARY 
In Chapters I through IV, we laid the foundation for this research: In Chapters I 
and II,  we discussed the significance of this research; in Chapter III, we discussed where 
the data was collected from; and in Chapter IV, we described how the data was collected 
and analyzed.  In the next two chapters, we present the findings of our research and the 
applications from the data we collected.  In Chapter V, we present the results and analysis 
of the data we collected and discuss possible reasons why the data behaved as it did.  In 
Chapter VI, we summarize the entire research, draw conclusions about the findings, and 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter V, we present an analysis of the data we collected in order to answer 
the three questions proposed for this research: 
1) Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
2) Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices 
being used?   
3) Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used? 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model: Drivers of Acquisition Practices and Performance 
(Apte, Apte et al., 2010b) 
Figure 2 from Chapter I is re-presented here to help illustrate the three questions 
visually.  We answer each question with supporting data through qualitative and 
quantitative approaches.  We used chi-squared hypothesis testing to determine 
relationships between service types, contract characteristics, and management practices in 
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relationship shown in Table 4 will be followed as the basis for the conclusions we draw 
in our analysis.  Appendix B provides the details for the chi-squared calculations we 
present in this chapter.   
Table 4.   Chi-Squared Hypothesis Testing Significance Level 
Significance Level Strength of Relationship 
0% ≤ significance < 33.33% Strong 
33.33% ≤ significance < 66.67% Moderate 
66.67% ≤ significance ≤ 100% Weak 
 
The data from this research provide insight into the management practices used by 
Army contracting organizations.  This data, however, is only a small fraction of the 
contracting work that is carried out by the Army MICC centers and DOCs.  Although the 
sample size from this study is small compared to the entire population, the information 
we collected will help guide the direction of future studies.   
B. SERVICE TYPE AND CONTRACT CHARACTERISTICS 
The data from our study shows that there is evidence of a moderate relationship 
between contract characteristics and service type, as conceptualized in Figure 2.  From 
the data we observed, complex-type service contracts had more sole-source awards than 
simple-type service contracts, leading to the increased use of other than the lowest priced 
technically acceptable (LPTA) award basis.  Complex-type service contracts also had a 
higher dollar value and required more modifications than simple-type service contracts.  
However, we also observed from the study that both complex- and simple-type service 
contracts had the same contract characteristics.  These observations include the fact that 
all contracts were awarded FFP and none had any incentive or award fees.  A summary of 
the significance levels between service types and contract characteristics is shown in 
Table 5.  The data in Table 5 show that there is a moderate relationship between service 
type and contract characteristics, but there are other factors involved that drive contract 
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Table 5.   Summary of Chi-Squared Test for Service Type to Contract 
Characteristics 
Factor 1 Factor 2 (Contract Characteristic) Significance Level 
Strength of 
Relationship 
Service Type Solicitation Type 49% Moderate 
Service Type Award Basis 49% Moderate 
Service Type Contract Cost (Base Value) 34% Moderate 
Service Type Number of Modifications 49% Moderate 
Service Type Award Cost Structure 100% Weak 
Service Type Incentive/Award Fees 100% Weak 
 
1. Solicitation Type 
Solicitation type refers to how contracts were advertised, either through full and 
open competition or by sole source.  Figure 10 shows the breakdown of contracts by 
service type and solicitation type; complex-type service contacts had more sole-source 
solicitations than simple-type service contracts.  A supporting argument is that complex-
type services may require unique skills, which limit the eligible suppliers.  For example, 
in one of the contracts we observed with a PSC D (complex type), there was a need for a 
software program, but only one supplier was available that could meet the requirements 
of the contract, and required sole-source solicitation. In another contract we observed that 
had PSC S (simple type), there were several suppliers available that could provide 
custodial services, which is not a unique requirement, so the availability of multiple 
suppliers allowed for the use of full and open competition.  Another possible reason for 
using different solicitation types involves the agency theory, in which the customer may 
want to go sole source with a specific vendor for a service, but the contracting office 
must use full and open competition to adhere to contracting regulations. 
However, uniqueness of requirements and a limited number of suppliers are only 
two reasons why a contract may be solicited through sole source.  Twelve of the 40 
contracts we observed were solicited through sole source; the justifications for these 
solicitations are shown in Figure 11.  Half of the justifications for sole-source 
solicitations were because of set-aside programs, such as Small Business (8A), National 
Industries for the Blind (NIB), and National Industries for the Severely Handicapped 
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characteristics and not just service type.  A chi-squared hypothesis test shows that the 
correlation between service type and solicitation type is significant at 49%, as seen in 
Table 5, which corresponds to a moderate relationship between these two variables.  
However, there is still evidence that contracts are being competed to the fullest extent 
whenever possible.  As Figure 10 shows, both complex- and simple-type service 
contracts were solicited more often through competition rather than by sole source.  This 
conforms to the FAR (2005, Part 6) and to other statutory requirements to use full and 
open competition when possible. 
Figure 10.   Analysis of Solicitation and Service Types 
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2. Award Basis 
Award basis is the method for selecting which contractor to award to.  The 
categories include awarding to the contractor with the lowest priced technically 
acceptable (LPTA) offer, negotiating the contract award, or using special programs to 
determine which contractor will get the award.  In Table 5, there is a moderate 
relationship between service type and award basis, with a significance level of 49%.  This 
is consistent with the relationship for service type and solicitation type, for the same 
reasons as discussed previously.  All of the contracts that we observed that were solicited 
through full and open competition were awarded based on LPTA.  However, when a sole-
source solicitation was used, other methods for determining best value and fair and 
reasonable price were implemented.  A possible explanation for why LPTA was the 
preferred method can be attributed to the transaction cost theory, which may explain why 
contracting offices may have been discouraged from using other methods with higher 
administrative burdens. 
3. Contract Value 
Complex-type service contracts also had a higher dollar base value than simple-
type service contracts, as seen in Figure 12.  The chi-squared hypothesis test shows that 
there is a moderate relationship between service type and contract dollar value, with a 
significance level of 34% (see Table 5).  One possible reason for this is that complex-type 
services may require a higher labor skill set.  For example, in one of the contracts we 
observed with a PSC R (complex type), there was an annual requirement for a medical 
instructor.  Another contract we observed had a PSC S (simple type) with an annual 
requirement for a groundskeeper.  The labor rate for the medical instructor was higher 
than the labor rate for the groundskeeper, which in turn created a higher contract cost for 
the complex-type service contract.  Another possible reason why complex-type services 
cost more is tied to the availability of suppliers, as explained in the previous paragraph.  
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Figure 12.   Average Base Cost of Contracts 
4. Modifications 
The types of modifications included:  changes to the scope of work, the exercising 
of option years, or administrative changes.  Complex-type service contracts had more 
modifications than simple-type service contracts, as shown in Figure 13.  There were 
more scope-change modifications for complex-type service contracts than simple-type 
service contracts.  There were also more modifications for exercise of options in simple-
type service contracts than complex-type service contracts.  A possible reason ties in with 
the agency theory when the contractor misinterprets the customer requirements, thus 
leading to a possible modification of the contract.  Another possible reason for these two 
observations is that complex services may be more difficult to define and may lead to 
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Figure 13.   Total Number of Modifications for Contracts by Service Type 
For example, a contract with PSC D (complex type) had scope-change 
modifications because it was not clear how many minutes would be used on a cellular 
phone contract; hence, the charge for minutes was adjusted periodically based on the 
actual number of minutes used.  In a contract with PSC S (simple type), the need for 
lunch service did not require any scope-change modifications because the quantity of 
service was the same every month.  However, the contract had modifications to exercise 
option years because of the repetitive, non-changing nature of this requirement.  
Although there are more administrative modifications in simple-type service contracts, 
these modifications are driven more by the organization rather than by the service type.  
For example, the administrative modifications made in both the complex- and simple-
type service contracts we observed were due mainly to the reorganization of the 
contracting office at one of the centers rather than to service type.  A chi-squared 
hypothesis test shows a moderate relationship between service type and the number of 
contract modifications, with a significance level of 49% (see Table 5).  Thus, service type 
does affect the contract characteristic of the number of modifications, but there are other 
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5. Award Cost Structure and Incentive/Award Fees 
The award cost structure is the method for how contractors are reimbursed, either 
through FFP or cost reimbursement.  Although there is evidence that service type affects 
contract characteristics, the data we observed for award cost structure and 
incentive/award fees show that other factors are involved.  A chi-squared hypothesis test 
between service type to award cost structure and use of award and incentive fees shows 
that there is a weak relationship among these variables, with a significance level of 100% 
(see Table 5).  For example, all of the contracts we observed were awarded FFP with no 
incentive or award fees.  The complex- and simple-type service contracts we observed 
were commercially available and standardized with prices consistent among competitors.  
There is little risk and uncertainty in these commercial services.  They do not require 
extra consideration to incentivize suppliers. This is different from research and 
development type services where a cost-reimbursable contract with an award or incentive 
fee is required to motivate contractors to take on the higher risk and uncertainty 
associated with this type of work. 
Another consideration for using FFP without incentive or award fees is that there 
is an additional burden of having to administer cost-reimbursable contracts as well as 
incentive or award fees.  This is related to the transaction cost theory.  The benefits (e.g., 
higher level of service) may not exceed the costs (e.g., higher pricing) the manpower to 
track the labor and materials for cost-reimbursable contracts and coordinating boards to 
determine if a contractor is deserving of a reward for high performance). 
C. SERVICE TYPE AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
There is a moderate relationship between service type and management practices 
based on the data we collected.  However, we did observe that there is an indirect 
relationship between service type and management practices, with service type affecting 
management practices through contract characteristics, as conceptualized in Figure 2.  
This indirect relationship is seen with the following management practices: the use of 
independent government estimates (IGEs), identification and changes to requirements, 
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management practices that were consistent across all of the MICC centers in our study, 
regardless of service type, including the use of a team approach, personnel assigned to 
manage the contracts, a KO assigned as the contracting lead, timeframes for award of 
contracts, and focus on pre-award for contract documentation. 
A summary of the significance levels between service types and management 
practices is shown in Table 6.  The data in Table 6 indicate that there is a moderate 
relationship between service type and management practices.  However, there is a strong 
indirect relationship between service type and management practices through contract 
characteristics. 
 
Table 6.   Summary of Chi-Squared Test for Service Type to Management 
Practices 
Factor 1 Factor 2 (Management Practice) Significance Level Strength of Relationship 
Service Type Use of IGEs 74% Weak 
Service Type 









Service Type Team Approach 100% Weak 
Service Type Number of Personnel Assigned to Contract 53% Moderate 
Service Type Contracting Lead 100% Weak 
Service Type Contract Award Time 34% Moderate 
Service Type Documentation (Acquisition Plan) 52% Moderate 
Service Type Documentation (SOW) 100% Weak 
Service Type Documentation (Pricing Analysis) 12% Strong 
Service Type Documentation (Quality Assurance Plan) 29% Strong 
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1. Independent Government Estimates 
The data show that the use of IGEs was the same for complex- and simple-type 
service contracts, as shown in Figure 14.  A chi-squared test of this data shows a weak 
relationship between service type and the management practice of using IGEs, with a 
significance level of 74% (see Table 6).  Further analysis of this data shows that IGEs are 
driven by the dollar values of contracts, as seen in Figure 15.  A chi-squared test of this 
data shows a strong relationship between the contract characteristic of contracts with a 
high dollar value and the management practice of using IGEs, with a significance level of 
2%.  Our analysis in the previous section shows contract dollar value being driven by 
service type, and therefore an indirect relationship is seen in which service type drives 
contract dollar value, which in turn affects the use of IGEs.  Per Army Regulation 70-13, 
Section 3-3.a, an IGE is required for all contracts that exceed the simplified acquisition 
threshold of $100,000 (DA, 2010, Chapter 3).  However, Figure 15 shows that some 
contracts over $100,000 did not have an IGE in the contract file.  Thus, further research is 
required in this area to collect data to determine the cause for not having an IGE in the 
contract file and to determine what its impact is to acquisition performance. 
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Figure 15.   Use of IGEs in Contracts by Dollar Value 
2. Personnel Assigned to Requirements Generation and Changes 
Personnel assigned to requirements generation and changes include key 
individuals who identify administrative and service requirements for a contract.  There is 
a strong relationship between service type and the number of personnel assigned to 
generate and make changes to contract requirements.  This is confirmed by the chi-
squared test, which had a significance level of 21% (see Table 6).  The average number 
of personnel generating or making changes to the requirements of a contract is higher in 
simple-type service contracts than complex-type service contracts.  Thus, there may be 
other factors involved that affect the number of personnel involved in generating and 
making changes to contract requirements.  For example, our discussion in Section B of 
this chapter shows that service type affects the number of modifications made on a 
contract.  However, these changes may be driven by the customer or the contracting 
office, which would drive who would develop the initial or new requirements.  Changes 
in contract requirements are implemented through modifications.  Therefore, there is an 
indirect relationship between service type and management practice in which service type 
affects the number of modifications made on a contract, which in turn affects the 
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3. Personnel Assigned to Contract Management Oversight 
Contract management oversight includes personnel who are assigned 
responsibilities to monitor contractor performance for post-award functions.  There is a 
strong relationship between service type and the number of personnel assigned to perform 
contract management oversight.  This is confirmed by the chi-squared test, which had a 
significance level of 20% (see Table 6).  Further analysis shows that complex-type 
service contracts have more personnel assigned to perform contract management 
oversight than simple-type service contracts.  This relationship is further supported by 
our discussion in Section B of this chapter in which we showed that service type affects 
contract dollar value, where complex-type service contracts have a higher dollar value 
than simple-type service contracts.  Therefore, there is an indirect relationship between 
service type and management practice in which service type affects the contract dollar 
value, which in turn affects the personnel involved in managing contract oversight. 
4. Team Approach 
The team approach concept includes personnel from the following departments: 
contracting, resource management, legal, and requiring activity (DA, 2010, Chapter 1).  
The data we observed show that in 38 of the 40 contracts observed there was evidence of 
a team approach found in the contract files.  Therefore, there is a weak relationship 
between service type and the management practice of using a team approach.  The chi-
squared test confirms this with a significance level of 100%, as seen in Table 6.  The use 
of a team approach is required per Army Regulation 70-13, Section 1-5.e (DA, 2010, 
Chapter 1), for all acquisition.  Thus, the observation is consistent with the Army 
Regulation in that 95% of the contracts used a team approach. 
5. Personnel Assigned to Contract 
There is a moderate relationship between service type and the number of 
personnel assigned to a contract.  This is confirmed by the chi-squared test, which had a 
significance level of 53% (see Table 6).  However, the number of personnel assigned to a 
contract is driven more by the standard practices of the MICC centers we observed in this 
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contract specialist for pre-award activities, and a KO, contract specialist, and COR for 
post-award activities.  Another center followed a standard practice of having a KO for 
pre-award, and a KO and customer representative for post-award.  Therefore, service type 
does not affect the number of personnel assigned as much as it affects the standard 
practices of a contracting office. 
6. Contracting Lead 
The KO was always assigned as the contracting lead for all 40 contracts we 
observed at the two MICC centers.  Therefore, there is a weak relationship between 
service type and the management practice of who leads the procurement of services.  A 
chi-squared test confirms this with a significance level of 100%, as seen in Table 6.  KOs 
are the only personnel who can obligate the government.  Further research should focus 
on who leads the little a rather than on just the contracting portion of acquisition.  For 
example, a project manager (PM) plays a lead role in ensuring that a project is completed 
from beginning to end for the entire project life cycle, whereas a KO is focused on 
ensuring the contract adheres to the FAR.  Thus, the PM leads the acquisition process and 
coordinates among the various supporting organizations involved, including the 
contracting, legal, budgeting, finance, and supported unit. 
7. Time to Award 
There is a moderate relationship between service type and contract award time.  
This is confirmed by the chi-squared test, which had a significance level of 34% (see 
Table 6).  Assuming a procurement administrative lead-time (PALT) of 60 days, the data 
shows complex-type service contracts achieve the PALT metric more often than simple-
type service contracts, as shown in Figure 16.  However, there are other factors that affect 
the award time for contracts that are not service related.  For example, award times may 
be driven by such factors as workload and availability of funds, which are not related to 
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Figure 16.   Contracts Meeting PALT by Service Type 
Another driving factor may be the number of personnel assigned to a contract.  
More personnel may increase productivity, but having to go through more management 
layers may increase the time to award a contract.  Thus, there is a transaction cost of 
having multiple personnel manage a contract that may be effective but not efficient.  
Thus, further research is required to obtain more data and determine what other factors 
affect award time. 
8. Documentation 
Chi-squared tests of the relationship between service type and documentation 
practices show mixed levels of significance, as seen in Table 6.  Further research is 
required to determine if service type affects documentation practices.  Other factors are 
involved that affect contract file documentation.  For example, 25% of the contracts 
observed did not have closeout letters because the work has not been completed and the 
contract term has not expired.  Another example is the practice by contracting offices of 
not keeping quality assurance surveillance plans (QASPs) in their files; instead, these 
files are maintained by the CORs.  However, there is evidence that shows documentation 
is driven by office function.  For example, Figure 17 shows that a majority of the 
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award activities.  Thus, contracting offices must put emphasis on post-award 
documentation to ensure the requirements of little a are satisfied and not just the 
requirements for procuring the service. 
 
Figure 17.   Contract File Documentation 
D. CAPACITY AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
The data we collected in our study show there is evidence that capacity does 
affect management practices.  However, because we collected data from only two MICC 
centers, the sample size is so small that only descriptive statistics can be used to analyze 
the data.  In order to confirm the findings of our analysis, further data is required from 
other MICC centers to ensure an adequate sample size for drawing inferences about the 
entire population.  Although the data is limited, the information that we collected reflects 
that capacity does affect management practices.  In the next section we present the 
observations from our study that support this conclusion.  We also present a conceptual 
model of how capacity and workload affect management practices, which can be applied 
to future research.  
1. Capacity Data 
Table 7 shows the capacity-related data of the two MICC centers we observed.  
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authorized, the level of certification that contracting personnel received through Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) training, and the years of experience 
that personnel have gained in the acquisition workforce.  The two centers were both 
staffed at over 90% of authorized billets, had at least 99% of the personnel certified at or 
beyond DAWIA Level II, and had over 66% of personnel with more than three years of 
experience.  Therefore, the centers have a strong capacity based on number of billets, 
certification, and experience.   
Both centers have the same total dollar value workload, as shown in Table 8.  
However, the number of contracts awarded and their individual dollar values were 
different at each center.  This difference can lead to different management practices.  For 
FY2010, MICC Center A was awarded fewer contracts than MICC Center B, but its 
individual dollar value per contract was higher.  Different management practices were 
used to fulfill contracting requirements.  For example, MICC Center A assigned 
contracting personnel to contracts by customer, whereas MICC Center B assigned 
contracting personnel to contracts by work leveling.  Although both centers have a strong 
capacity, the focus of work effort tends to be on pre-award functions rather than on post-
award functions.  For instance, both centers had strong documentation for SOWs (pre-
award documents) and very little for QASPs (post-award documents), as discussed in 
Section C of this chapter.  A possible reason for this is that when there is not enough 
capacity, the focus shifts to what an organization sees as the priority.  For example, in a 
contracting office, the priority may be more on awarding a contract and less on contract 
administration and closeout.  Therefore, capacity does affect management practices.  
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MICC Center A MICC Center B 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Billets 
Warranted (Filled/Authorized) 19/19 100% 24/24 100% 
Unwarranted (Filled/Authorized) 18/21 86% 24/28 86% 
Certification 
DAWIA I 1 2% 0 0% 
DAWIA II 27 66% 19 68% 
DAWIA III 13 32% 9 32% 
Experience 
< 1 year 3 10% 2 4% 
1–2 years 1 3% 1 2% 
2–3 years 6 19% 10 21% 
> 3 years 21 68% 35 73% 
 
Table 8.   FY2010 Service Contracts Awarded 
(MICC Headquarters, 2011) 
 MICC Center A MICC Center B 
Total dollar value of service 
contracts awarded ($1,000) 293,000 301,000 
Total number of service 
contracts awarded 350 804 
Average dollar value/service 
contract ($K/contract) 838 374 
 
2. Conceptual Model 
A conceptual model for relating capacity to management practices is illustrated in 
the following equations: 
   (2) 
  (3) 
   (4) 
Capacity is driven by office staffing as well as by training and experience of 
personnel.  The workload is driven by the type of contracts that need to be awarded and 
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capacity is used to accomplish the workload.  To determine if these management 
practices are effective and efficient, future studies need to ask the question, how is 
success measured in acquisition?  This is a complex question because every organization 
involved in the little a may have different perspectives on success.  The stakeholders 
involved in acquisition include the PM, the KO, the comptroller, the lawyer, and the 
customer.  All have different objectives, yet they all support each other in an integrated 
network to achieve a common goal.  Therefore, the best management practices are the 
ones that most effectively and efficiently satisfy the requirements of an entire 
organization rather than those of only one specific functional area. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented the data we collected from our research and the 
findings from our analysis.  We answered the three research questions proposed in this 
study.  First, there is a moderate relationship between service type and contract 
characteristics.  Second, there is a moderate relationship between service type and 
management practices.  Third, there is evidence of a relationship between capacity and 
management practices, but additional data collection is required to further confirm this 
finding.  These findings from our analyses further support the recurring themes we 
discussed in Chapter II.  These recurring themes are the shortfalls in human capital and 
not having capable management processes, which both affect performance of service 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
A. SUMMARY 
This research project was conducted to help further previous studies in DoD 
services acquisition.  The goal was to answer three questions related to acquisition in 
order to better understand the drivers of management practices.  This leads to finding 
ways for improving performance in service contracting as services continue to increase in 
scope and dollar amount for the DoD.  The studies we conducted at the two Army MICC 
centers serve as templates for follow-on studies to be conducted at the 39 remaining 
MICC offices. 
In Chapter I we provided an overview of our study and background information 
that established the need for this research.  In Chapter II, we presented previous research 
in services acquisition management and the theories that we applied in this study.  In 
Chapter III, we introduced the Gansler Report and the recent reorganization of Army 
contracting units, including the establishment of the MICC.  In Chapter IV, we laid out 
the research methodology we used for collecting and analyzing our data.  We presented 
the results and analysis of the study in Chapter V and summarize them in the next 
section. 
B. CONCLUSION 
1. Research Findings 
This study answered the following research questions: 
1) Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
2) Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices 
being used?   
3) Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used? 
In response to Question 1, we found that service type does affect contract 
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simple-type service contracts, leading to more use of methods other than LPTA as an 
award basis.  Complex-type service contracts also had higher dollar values and required 
more modifications than simple-type service contracts.  However, we also observed in the 
study that both complex- and simple-type service contracts had the same contract 
characteristics, as well as that all contracts were awarded FFP and that none had any 
incentive or award fees. 
For Question 2, we found that service type indirectly affects the management 
practices being used.  This indirect relationship is seen with the following management 
practices: the use of independent government estimates (IGEs), identification and 
changes to requirements, and personnel assigned to perform contract management 
oversight.  We observed management practices that were consistent across the MICC 
centers in our study, regardless of service type, including the use of a team approach, 
personnel assigned to manage the contracts, assigning the KO as the contracting lead, 
time frames for the award of contracts, and focus on pre-award activities for contract 
documentation. 
Finally, with regard to Question 3 we found that there is evidence of capacity 
affecting management practices.  The two centers we observed had similar capacities but 
different types of workloads.  This led to differences in management practices, but there 
were also practices that were standard across both the centers.  Therefore, capacity does 
affect the management practices being used at the different centers.  However, the data 
we collected from only two MICC centers is limited.  In order to confirm the findings of 
our analysis, further data is required from other MICC centers to ensure an adequate 
enough sample size to draw inferences about the entire population.   
Although each center had different management practices, there were standard 
practices that both centers followed for awarding service contracts.  For instance, both 
centers solicited contracts through full and open competition as much as possible and 
awarded contracts by FFP with no award or incentive fees.  Also, both centers utilized a 
team approach and maintained consistency in assigning personnel for management of 
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Army MICC centers.  However, consideration has to be given to the uniqueness of each 
center, which affects some of the different management practices being used at each. 
2. Recommendations 
The focus of this research was to identify drivers of management practices in 
order to help improve performance in services acquisition.  There are no perfect systems.  
Therefore, there should always be a focus on continuous improvement.  The two 
recommendations we make in this section are based on the data we observed and 
analyzed in this research. 
Our first recommendation, focusing on the little a, is for acquisition professionals 
to continue to emphasize a holistic approach for meeting the needs of customers.  The 
mission of a contracting office is not to award contracts, but to support the operational 
units through contracting.  There are various players involved in the acquisition process, 
and contracting is just one part of the entire system.  However, contracting is nonetheless 
a critical element to the success of the DoD mission.   
Our second recommendation, again focusing on the little a, is for managers to 
allow flexibility in contracting practices.  Contracting offices should maintain standard 
processes, but not be limited in utilizing other contracting tools that are available and that 
can provide better performance than current practices.  Service requirements are dynamic 
and, as a result, what was a best practice yesterday may not be the best practice of today 
or of the future.  Developing the workforce will not increase the number of personnel, but 
it will increase their knowledge of the contracting tools available to them.  This, in turn, 
improves performance, which supports the concept of “do more without more” 
(USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 4 ).   
Our third recommendation, still focusing on the little a, is for contracting offices 
to continue to emphasize management of contracts through their entire life cycle.  An 
acquisition plan helps identify all the requirements that need to be met, which can prevent 
costly changes to contracts later in the process.  Also, post-award functions are a critical 
part in the contracting process and cannot be overlooked.  A requirement is not met after 
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carried out, which ensures that both the contractor and the government are meeting the 
requirements established in the contract. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section has two parts.  The first part is our recommendations for furthering 
the existing study by making modifications to the data collection form.  In the second part 
we make suggestions for research into different areas of acquisition that we discovered 
during this research project but that are not within the scope of this study. 
1. Expand Study to Other MICC Units and Military Departments 
One modification that should be made to the data collection is to increase the 
sample size.  The sample size we collected in this research is small compared to the total 
number of contracts awarded at the two centers.  In Table 8, the two centers combined 
awarded a total of 1,154 service contracts for FY2010, with 564 contracts combined 
falling into the PSC categories of R, D, J, and S (MICC Headquarters, 2011).  We 
observed 40 contracts total in this study, which only accounted for 7% of the 564 
contracts described above.  This is an even smaller sample size considering that the 
contracts observed were across several fiscal years and from only two of the 41 MICC 
contracting offices.  Thus, to make stronger inferences about the data, there needs to be 
an increase in the sample size for the PSCs observed in this study, and other MICC 
contracting offices need to be studied.  Based on the data in Figure 9, we recommend the 
observation of contracts at the five remaining regional MICC contracting centers and a 
look into the other 34 DOCs.  In this study we observed only 20 contracts per center.  
Applying the learning curve theory, future researchers might consider observing 30 
contracts per center, assuming an 80% learning curve and allowing two days  to collect 
data at each center (16 hours at each center).   
A second modification that should be made to the data collection form is to 
continue to refine the questions on the form in order to limit the possibility for 
misinterpretation.  For example, team approach in this study was assumed to have 
occurred if there was evidence of assigned roles documented in the contract files.  Army 
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management, legal, and requiring activity personnel” (DA, 2010, Chapter 1, Section 1-
5.e).  Thus, this provides for a clearer definition of team approach that should be used in 
future studies.  Another example of how to refine the research questions would be to 
clearly differentiate the roles and responsibilities in the acquisition process.  This 
distinction is critical when asking who leads the acquisition of a requirement because one 
is focused on the entire process (the PM), whereas another is focused on the contracting 
(the KO). 
Finally, the model we used in Section D of Chapter V should be further refined.  
We presented the variables in conceptual form.  Future studies should define the drivers 
of these variables.  For instance, capacity is defined by billets, training, and experience.  
However, questions should also be asked of what the baselines are for these drivers in 
order to determine if their capacity is adequate enough to carry out the workload. 
Extending this research to other military departments will allow an opportunity to 
compare management practices.  This will help identify best practices that can be applied 
across the DoD.  With the focus of the acquisition community on “doing more without 
more” (USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 4), reform efforts in acquisition should include scientific 
management (efficiency), war on waste (economy), watchful eye (fairness), and 
liberation management (entrepreneurialism).  These efforts can be applied individually or 
concurrently to help improve service acquisition management practices in the DoD. 
2. Other Acquisition-Related Studies 
One of the findings in the literature review is that the Big A is a disjointed system, 
with various units that have competing interests.  Similarly, the little a is also disjointed 
with units having different objectives.  Therefore, each organization may define success 
differently.  We propose a research topic analyzing how each of these individual units 
defines success in order to determine how to align these goals toward a common purpose.   
Another research topic we propose is to analyze transaction costs.  Contract costs 
may be reported with only what is paid to a contractor.  However, there are indirect costs 
involved that must be accounted for to help ensure that the contract gets solicited, 
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implementing a contract modification, conducting a pricing analysis, and executing 
quality assurance on a contract.  These are not costs paid to a contractor, but they are still 
costs to the government that must be paid through time and money resources for 
government personnel.  Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis must be done on these indirect 
costs to determine if there are potential savings from reducing these costs, with 
consideration of what risks are involved. 
A final topic we propose is to continue looking for opportunities to “do more 
without more,” as mentioned by Secretary Carter (USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 4).  If there is 
no increase in the capacity to execute the work, then there must be better processes to 
increase productivity.  Some examples in the scope of this research topic would be to 
analyze contractor manpower data reports in order to determine the cost drivers, to 
compare costs between sourcing service requirements through government personnel 
versus contractors, and to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of office organization by 
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APPENDIX A.  SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION FORM 
Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command Services 
Acquisition Data Collection Form (Part I) 
 
1. Office 
MICC Center Fort Knox: CCMI-RCK   
MICC Center Fort Sam Houston: CCMI-RCS 
 
2. Contract number and title 
________________ 
 
3. What type of service is this contract (mark all that apply)? 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (R) 
Data Processing and Telecommunications (D) 
Maintenance and Repair of Equipment (J) 
Utilities and Housekeeping (S) 
 
4. What approach was the contract solicited through? 
Competitively Bid (Full and Open)      
Sole Source 
Other (please specify):__________ 
 
5. What was the type of contract awarded for this service? 
Fixed-price      
Cost-reimbursable      
Other (please specify):__________ 
 
6. What incentive/award type does this contract include? 
Incentive Fee      
Award Fee      
Award Term      
Other (please specify):__________ 
 




8. How many modifications were there, and what were the reasons for each one? 
________________ 
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IGE – Yes/No 
Value_______ 
 
10. What was the award basis for this contract? 
Lowest-Price Technically-Acceptable (LPTA) 
Best-Value (e.g. use of trade-off analysis) 
Other (please specify):__________ 
  
11. Was a Project Team Approach used in the acquisition of this service contract? 
Yes    
No   
 
12. How many people in the following positions are assigned to this service contract? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 
13. Who leads the acquisition of this service contract? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 
14. Who generates and decides changes to the service requirements? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 
15. Who performs the surveillance of this service contract? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
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Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 







17. Were the following items documented in the contract file? 
Acquisition plan – Yes/No 
Statement of work (SOW) / Performance Work Statement (PWS) – Yes/No 
Pricing analysis – Yes/No 
Price negotiation memorandum (PNM) – Yes/No 
Quality Assurance Plan (QASP) – Yes/No 
Closeout letter – Yes/No 
 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 68 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command Services 
Acquisition Data Collection Form (Part II) 
 




MICC Center Fort Knox: CCMI-RCK   
MICC Center Fort Sam Houston: CCMI-RCS 
 
2. How many service contracts were awarded for FY10 in the following services? 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (R) ____ 
Data Processing and Telecommunications (D) ____ 
Maintenance and Repair of Equipment (J)____ 
Utilities and Housekeeping (S)____ 
 
3. What was the total dollar value awarded in FY10 for the following services? 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (R) ____ 
Data Processing and Telecommunications (D) ____ 
Maintenance and Repair of Equipment (J)____ 
Utilities and Housekeeping (S)____ 
 
4. What was the annual budget for the government service contracts staff in FY10? 
______________ 
 
5. How many billets are authorized for the following positions? 
Contracting Officers/Contract Specialists (Warranted)_____ 




6. How many authorized billets are filled for the following positions? 
Contracting Officers/Contract Specialists (Warranted)_____ 




7. What are the number of contracting personnel Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) certified in the following levels? 
DAWIA Level I (authorized____, filled____, trained____) 
DAWIA Level II (authorized____, filled____, trained____) 
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8. How many Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) / Quality Assurance 










Beyond 36 months 
 





Beyond 36 months 
 





Beyond 36 months 
 





Beyond 36 months 
 
13. What is the average number of service contracts that a person in each of the 
following positions manages? 
Contracting officers____ 
Contract specialists (1102)_____ 
Project managers (1101)_____ 
QAE____ 
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APPENDIX B.  CHI-SQUARED CALCULATIONS 
1. Service Type and Contract Characteristics 
 
Table B1.1 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Solicitation Type 
Contingency Table       
  Solicitation Type   
Service Type Full/Open Competition Sole-Source TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 13 7 20 
Simple (J and S) 15 5 20 
TOTAL 28 12 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.4762 
df     1 
p-value       0.4902 
chi-squared Critical      2.7055 
 
Table B1.2 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Award Basis 
Contingency Table       
  Award Basis   
Service Type 
Lowest-Price 
Technically-Acceptable Other TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 13 7 20 
Simple (J and S) 15 5 20 
TOTAL 28 12 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.4762 
df     1 
p-value       0.4902 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B1.3 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Contract Cost 
Contingency Table       
  Contract Cost (Base-Value)   
Service Type <$100K ≥$100K TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 10 10 20 
Simple (J and S) 13 7 20 
TOTAL 23 17 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.9207 
df     1 
p-value       0.3373 
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Table B1.4 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Modifications 
Contingency Table       
  Modifications   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 9 11 20 
Simple (J and S) 9 11 20 
TOTAL 18 22 40 
chi-squared Stat     0 
df     1 
p-value       1 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B1.5 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Award Cost Structure 
Contingency Table       
  Award Cost Structure   
Service Type Firm-Fixed Price Cost-Reimbursable TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 20 0 20 
Simple (J and S) 20 0 20 
TOTAL 40 0 40 
chi-squared Stat     0 
df     0 
p-value       1 
chi-squared Critical      1 
 
Table B1.6 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Incentive/Award Fees 
Contingency Table       
  Incentive/Award Fees   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 13 7 20 
Simple (J and S) 15 5 20 
TOTAL 28 12 40 
chi-squared Stat     0 
df     0 
p-value       1 
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2. Service Type and Management Practices 
 
Table B2.1 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Use of Independent Government Estimates 
Contingency Table       
  Use of Independent Government Estimate   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 7 13 20 
Simple (J and S) 8 12 20 
TOTAL 15 25 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.1067 
df     1 
p-value       0.744 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B2.2 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Number of Personnel Generating/Changing Requirements 
Contingency Table        
  
Number of Personnel  
Generating/Changing Requirements   
Service Type 1 2 3 TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 8 9 3 20 
Simple (J and S) 6 6 8 20 
TOTAL 14 15 11 40 
chi-squared Stat      3.1584 
df      2 
p-value        0.2061 
chi-squared Critical       5.9915 
 
Table B2.3 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Number of Personnel Performing Contract Management Oversight 
Contingency Table        
  
Number of Personnel  
Performing Contract Management Oversight   
Service Type 1 2 3 TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 0 10 10 20 
Simple (J and S) 3 9 8 20 
TOTAL 3 19 18 40 
chi-squared Stat      3.2749 
df      2 
p-value        0.1945 
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Table B2.4 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Team Approach 
Contingency Table       
  Team Approach   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 19 1 20 
Simple (J and S) 19 1 20 
TOTAL 38 2 40 
chi-squared Stat     0 
df     1 
p-value       1 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B2.5 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Number of Personnel Assigned 
Contingency Table        
  Number of Personnel Assigned   
Service Type 2 3 5 TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 0 10 10 20 
Simple (J and S) 1 11 8 20 
TOTAL 1 21 18 40 
chi-squared Stat      1.2698 
df      2 
p-value        0.53 
chi-squared Critical       5.9915 
 
Table B2.6 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and Contracting Lead 
Contingency Table       
  Contracting Lead   
Service Type KO Other TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 20 0 20 
Simple (J and S) 20 0 20 
TOTAL 40 0 40 
chi-squared Stat     0 
df     0 
p-value       1 
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Table B2.7 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Meeting Procurement Administrative Lead Time 
Contingency Table       
  Meet Procurement Administrative Lead Time   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 10 10 20 
Simple (J and S) 7 13 20 
TOTAL 17 23 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.9207 
df     1 
p-value       0.3373 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B2.8 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Documentation (Acquisition Plan) 
Contingency Table       
  Documentation (Acquisition Plan)   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 7 13 20 
Simple (J and S) 9 11 20 
TOTAL 16 24 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.4167 
df     1 
p-value       0.5186 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B2.9 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Documentation (Statement of Work/Performance Work Statement) 
Contingency Table       
  
Documentation (Statement of Work/Performance Work 
Statement)   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 19 1 20 
Simple (J and S) 19 1 20 
TOTAL 38 2 40 
chi-squared Stat     0 
df     1 
p-value       1 
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Table B2.10 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Documentation (Pricing Analysis) 
Contingency Table       
  Documentation (Pricing Analysis)   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 14 6 20 
Simple (J and S) 18 2 20 
TOTAL 32 8 40 
chi-squared Stat     2.5 
df     1 
p-value       0.1138 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B2.11 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Documentation (Quality Assurance Plan) 
Contingency Table       
  Documentation (Quality Assurance Plan)   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 7 13 20 
Simple (J and S) 4 16 20 
TOTAL 11 29 40 
chi-squared Stat     1.1285 
df     1 
p-value       0.2881 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
 
Table B2.12 Chi-squared Results for Service Type and  
Documentation (Closeout Letter) 
Contingency Table       
  Documentation (Closeout Letter)   
Service Type Yes No TOTAL 
Complex (R and D) 2 17 20 
Simple (J and S) 1 19 20 
TOTAL 3 36 40 
chi-squared Stat     0.4191 
df     1 
p-value       0.5174 
chi-squared Critical      3.8415 
=
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